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What is the Interpreter’s Role in 
Treatment Decision-Making? 
 
 
 
Andrew Clifford  
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
There is a meeting taking place in an oncologist’s office, and several 
people are gathered around a table. The first of these is the oncologist, a 
physician and native English-speaker who was born and raised in 
Canada. Next is an elderly but competent male patient, a man who spent 
almost his entire life in Hong Kong and who speaks only Cantonese. 
Accompanying the patient are his adult children, who were born in Hong 
Kong and spent most of their formative years there. They are most 
comfortable speaking Cantonese, but they have few difficulties 
expressing themselves in English. Finally, there is also an interpreter 
present whose working languages are Cantonese and English. 
 
 In the course of the meeting, the physician explains the 
patient’s diagnosis. The patient has hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC), a 
form of liver cancer. It is one of the most common types of cancer in 
Asia (Yeung et al., 2005), and it is a serious health concern in Asian 
communities in North America (Nguyen et al., 2004; McGlynn et al., 
2001). Patients with HCC have a low survival rate. In most cases, 
tumours are not amenable to curative treatments, and the median time 
between diagnosis and death can be as short as three months (Yeung et 
al., 2005). The physician then goes on to say that there are two treatment 
options for the patient: curative therapies, which will be invasive, painful, 
and likely ineffective; and palliative therapies, which will seek to make 
the patient comfortable and increase his quality of life in the advanced 
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stages of a life-threatening disease. Now, the physician explains, he 
needs to obtain informed consent from the patient before pursuing one of 
these treatment options. 
 
 After relaying this information in English, the physician turns 
to the interpreter, and he nods to indicate that she should translate for the 
elderly patient. However, before she can begin, the patient’s adult 
children interrupt with a frantic request: “Please don’t tell our father he 
has cancer! We don’t want him to know.” 
 
 This kind of scenario places the interpreter at the heart of an 
intense and emotional dilemma. Somehow, a decision about treatment 
needs to come out of the meeting in the oncologist’s office, but there is 
disagreement about how that decision will come about. The physician 
believes that sharing information with the patient is a necessary 
condition for decision-making. To withhold information from the patient 
would be unethical. The adult children believe that their father must be 
protected from the pain and harm of traumatic news. To expose him to 
such trauma would be to neglect their duty as loving children. The 
danger in this situation lies in the very real possibility that each side will 
become entrenched in its respective interpretation. The physician may 
retreat to a position consistent with his view of the events, concluding 
that “the patient’s children are being unreasonable, and they want me to 
be unethical!” The patient’s children may strike a similarly 
uncompromising stance by telling themselves that “the doctor wants to 
hurt our father, and he expects us to be disloyal!” If no one makes a 
move to bridge the distance between the two sides, it is likely that the 
situation will end badly. The physician may be prevented from giving 
quality care, the patient’s children may experience a great deal of 
distress, frustration, and grief, and the patient may suffer unnecessarily. 
  
 Someone in this situation needs to find a way to break through 
this potential impasse, and this article argues that the person best suited 
to do so is the interpreter. In making this argument, we are parting 
company with those who feel that the interpreter’s role should be more 
limited, that she should restrict herself to acting like a simple language 
conduit. Instead, we suggest that there are circumstances under which it 
is justifiable and even desirable for the interpreter to take on a more 
interventionist role and to participate in the encounter in a more active 
way.  
 
 Of all the people present in the oncologist’s office, the 
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interpreter is arguably the most able to mediate between the parties and 
to point the way towards an acceptable resolution. Her role already 
requires her to navigate between the two language-cultures represented 
in the room, and her expertise navigating in this way also provides her 
with the necessary foundation for a more developed sense of 
cross-cultural communication. For example, even in something as 
simple as translating a typical greeting–the standard Cantonese phrase 
nei hou literally means “you good,” but it would be strange to render it 
by anything other than an equivalent English greeting like “hello”–the 
interpreter is on some level aware that people from different language 
groups behave differently even when faced with the same situation.  
 
 However, cultural knowledge gleaned purely through language 
will not be enough to allow the interpreter to actively intervene in the 
oncologist’s office. Indeed, despite the languages she shares with the 
other people in the room, there may be some important cultural 
differences that separate her from her clients. If the interpreter has only 
recently arrived in Canada, for instance, her exposure to English in other 
parts of the world may not have been enough to allow her to understand 
the physician’s attitudes and actions. Similarly, if she learned her 
Cantonese somewhere other than Hong Kong, she may not be able to put 
herself in the shoes of the adult children. To develop her cross-cultural 
communicative competence to the level required by this situation, the 
interpreter must become consciously aware of three key variables:  
 
1. Culture-based communication preferences,  
2. Ethical principles in cross-cultural healthcare, and  
3. Levels of trust between practitioners and interpreters.  
 
 The goal of this article is to explore the interpreter’s 
interventionist role in ethically delicate situations. We will do this first 
by examining each of the three variables listed above as they apply to 
healthcare interpreting and informed consent. With this examination in 
place, we will then proceed to describe the strategies that interpreters can 
use to become active interveners. Finally, as a concluding thought, we 
will consider the implications that these strategies have for interpreter 
training. 
 
II. Culture-Based Communication Preferences 
 
Just what is the source of the disagreement between the physician and 
the patient’s children? At first glance, the positions adopted by the two 
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parties may seem to be little more than a difference of personal opinion. 
The physician, being who he is, feels one way, and the children, being 
who they are, feel another way. The whole situation may appear to be 
individual, and random. The interpreter may initially think that it is 
difficult to predict each party’s responses, and that it is therefore also 
difficult to prepare to mediate between them. 
 
 Indeed, it is important to recognize that there is an idiosyncratic 
element in communication, that people have personal communication 
preferences. The doctor’s preference is to share information openly and 
freely with everyone involved. The children’s preference is to restrict 
information sharing in a way that respects the roles of individuals within 
the family–as children, their duty is to protect their respected parent. 
However, upon closer examination, it is possible to see that personal 
preferences are expressed within a wider cultural frame.  
 
 When people are raised in a particular culture, they are exposed 
to a model of communication behaviour. It constitutes a norm, or a 
yardstick, that they use to make decisions about their own courses of 
action. Those decisions may lead them to subscribe to or rebel against, to 
varying degrees, the model they see around them. But they will 
nevertheless be influenced by the model. Their sense of a norm, and their 
own personal decisions, will be different from those of other people, 
who have grown up in a different culture.  
 
 To categorize the differences in models from culture to culture, 
the literature on cross-cultural communication has described a wide 
variety of cultural tendencies. Here, we limit our discussion to three 
specific tendencies that are at play in the oncologist’s office. The three in 
question are derived from the work of Hofstede (2001) and Hall (1976), 
and are outlined briefly below. 
 
1. Individualism vs. Collectivism  
This first tendency describes the strength of an individual’s 
integration into a larger group. In individualist cultures, the 
individual is seen as the base unit in society. A great deal of 
value is placed on being independent, speaking one’s mind, and 
offering personal opinions.  
 
In collectivist cultures, the base unit is the group, and 
individuals build their identities around membership in a family, 
in a clan, or even in society as a whole. In terms of values, 
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collectivism stresses being dependent on other group members, 
demonstrating loyalty to them, and harmonizing with them.  
 
2. Small Power Distance vs. Large Power Distance  
The second tendency relates to the way in which a culture views 
inequality. A culture that prefers a small power distance is a 
culture that believes power should be distributed equally. 
People generally try to downplay obvious signs of power, and 
they subscribe to the belief that all people are the same. It is 
acceptable to question or criticize those in positions of authority, 
and everyone is entitled to the “truth” or the “facts.”  
 
In contrast, a culture that prefers a large power distance believes 
in unequal power distribution. In general, people take notice of 
the signs of authority, and all people play a role within an 
established vertical hierarchy. Public contradiction or criticism 
of an authority figure is not tolerated (instead a great deal of 
importance is placed on saving face), and there is a high degree 
of deference towards the authority figure’s personal wisdom. 
 
3. Low-Context Orientation vs. High-Context Orientation  
The third and final tendency has to do with the preference for 
transmitting meaning explicitly or implicitly. In a culture that is 
marked by a low-context orientation, meaning is predominantly 
contained within the actual content of an utterance. People say 
things directly, and they go “straight to the point.” They make 
few assumptions about the background knowledge of their 
interlocutors, and they offer a great deal of explanation.  
 
In a culture that is marked by a high-context orientation, a great 
deal of meaning may be within the receiver of a message or 
within the setting where it is transmitted. Producers of an 
utterance will often talk around an idea, setting all the pieces in 
place, with the exception of the main point. It is the role of the 
receiver to use gestures, space, and even silence to reconstitute 
information missing from the utterance. (Indeed, if the producer 
were to provide all the information, receivers might feel that 
they were being talked down to or that their intelligence was 
being insulted.) Little overt explanation is offered, and there is 
an assumption that producer and receiver have a great deal of 
shared knowledge. 
 
 230
 There are two important points that the interpreter must bear in 
mind when she tries to apply these tendencies in her work. The first is 
that, although we have explained each of the tendencies here in terms of 
extremes, each one is, in reality, a continuum. No one culture is purely 
high-context oriented or entirely collectivist; instead, a culture may be 
described as being more high-context oriented or more collectivist as 
compared to another. Within each tendency, there is a wide variety of 
possibilities. If the interpreter works with people from a variety of 
backgrounds–that is, if she interprets for people from different 
English-speaking countries or for people from different places where 
Cantonese is spoken–she should expect to see the tendencies manifested 
to different degrees. She may find, for example, that there is a 
widespread preference for a small power distance among those clients 
who were born and raised in Canada, but that this preference is even 
stronger among clients who were born and raised in Australia (on this 
point, see Hofstede, 2001).  
 
 Second, as was pointed out earlier, individuals may subscribe in 
varying degrees to the tendencies in the cultures around them. For 
instance, the interpreter may encounter a client who has been raised in a 
culture that is, relative to another, marked by low power distance. Yet 
her client may nevertheless have a personal preference for high power 
distance. For this reason, she should not make unquestioned assumptions 
about a client based on their place of origin. Instead, she should examine 
her client’s behaviour for evidence that suggests the degree to which his 
or her personal manner of communicating is consistent with wider 
tendencies in the client’s culture. In other words, the people the 
interpreter will encounter in her work have all been exposed to broad 
culture-based tendencies in their lives, but they ultimately make personal 
decisions about their own communication preferences. 
 
 To understand how the interpreter might use her familiarity 
with communication preferences to better understand an interpreted 
encounter, we need only reconsider the situation in the oncologist’s 
office in the light of the cultural tendencies outlined above. The 
physician, it would appear, prefers communication that is individualist, 
marked by small power distance, and low-context oriented. His concern 
lies primarily with the patient as an individual, and he is likely to 
maintain that the patient is entitled to the “facts” of the situation as a 
matter of individual right. He would like to transmit these facts in an 
open and direct manner to the patient. He may see his own input as “just” 
his personal, albeit informed, opinion, and he expects the patient to 
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speak his own mind as they work together, as two people who are more 
or less equal, to make a treatment decision. He may expect the patient to 
ask questions of him, to disagree with him, or even to criticize him (the 
physician is, after all, delivering some very bad news).  
 
 By comparison, the adult children’s preferences lean in the 
direction of collectivism, large power distance, and high-context 
orientation. Their concern also lies with the patient, but they clearly 
perceive him in terms of his group membership–he is their father, the 
senior member of the family, and someone to whom they owe respect 
and loyalty. They see their relationship with their father from the 
perspective of interdependence. They have relied on him for many 
things in the past, and he now relies on them, this time for protection. 
The physician wants to present their father with information (perhaps a 
terminal diagnosis) that is extremely threatening to his honour and that 
may cause him to lose face. What is more, the physician wants to present 
this information in a way that is insulting to their father’s intelligence. If 
the children were to have their way, they might eventually choose to 
share the bad news with their father, but in a way that is subtle and 
requires their father to make inferences. For example, if their father asks 
about his own prognosis, they may simply respond with silence to 
indicate the worst of all possible answers. They may feel that there is no 
need to convey this information bluntly. In addition, they may be very 
surprised by the doctor’s consultative manner. They regard the doctor as 
an authority whose personal wisdom they should respect, and they 
expect him to make a decision. To see the doctor invite questions, 
disagreement and potential criticism may be disconcerting.  
 
 For the interpreter, the connection between the two parties’ 
responses and larger notion of culture-based communication has an 
important ramification. Initially, the situation in the oncologist’s office 
seemed like a random event. When she considered it at the discrete level 
of the actors involved, the disagreement between the physician and the 
adult children seemed to be the result of the interplay between individual 
personalities, something that would have been difficult to predict 
beforehand. However, when she stops to take into account larger cultural 
considerations, she may begin to see a pattern. Experience may have 
taught her that certain kinds of communicative preferences are common 
among her English-speaking clients, while others are widespread among 
the Cantonese-speakers that she serves. In fact, if she had known some of 
the details of this particular interpreting assignment before she walked in 
the office door–Western physician, frightening prognosis, Eastern 
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patient, and Eastern family–she may have been able to predict important 
behaviours to watch for in the encounter. In turn, her predictions may 
have allowed her to better prepare for the encounter. 
 
III. Ethical Principles in Cross-Cultural Healthcare 
 
In the previous section, our discussion focused on culture-based 
communication preferences. As we have seen, individual actions are 
subject to the broad influence of culture as a variable, and this variable 
provides us with a helpful lens through which to understand and, to a 
certain extent, predict individual actions. However, culture is a very 
general variable that is at work in a variety of settings. The encounter in 
the oncologist’s office takes place within one very specific setting–a 
medical one–and this too has an influence on the turn of events. 
 
 All the actors assembled in the oncologist’s office are there 
because they are trying to make a decision about medical treatment. This 
decision is ultimately a moral one–the people in the room are trying to 
distinguish the right way of handling the situation from the wrong way of 
handling it. Indeed, one of the features of communication in healthcare 
that distinguishes it from communication in other areas is that healthcare 
frequently involves making moral judgments about human welfare 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1983; Veatch & Flack, 1997).  
 
 For a judgment to be moral, it must typically have three 
characteristics. First, it must try to minimize ego-driven concerns by 
ensuring that concern for the other is taken into account. Second, it must 
be universal, that is, it must determine whether all relevantly similar 
cases are treated in a like manner. Finally, it must be ultimate, verifying 
that a primary commitment is made to the issue at hand and not to some 
other competing value (Beauchamp & Childress, 1983; Veatch & Flack, 
1997).   
 
 It’s easy to see how the characteristics of moral judgments 
shape the encounter in the oncologist’s office. For example, the patient’s 
children may eye the physician suspiciously. They may wonder whether 
the doctor is only concerned with his own interests. After all, it is likely 
easier for him to spit out a diagnosis than it is to think about the traumatic 
impact that diagnosis will have on the patient. Similarly, they may 
question whether the doctor would be so disrespectful and direct with 
other patients. Or has their father been singled out in some way? Finally, 
the children may worry that their father is not getting the best care. The 
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doctor may be allowing his value for another issue–like treatment costs 
or recruiting patients for a clinical trial–to outweigh his concern for their 
father.  
 
 For his part, the physician is likely to have parallel concerns. 
He may wonder whether the children are operating out of concern for 
themselves. To be sure, it is probably easier for them to deny their 
father’s prognosis than to transmit the information he needs to make a 
decision about it. Likewise, he may question whether the children, in 
discussing someone else’s treatment, would agree that the truth should 
be kept hidden from that person too. Or have they singled out their father 
for some reason? Finally, he may wonder whether the children are 
allowing their father to receive the best care. They may instead be 
allowing the value they place on other considerations–such as their 
respect for their father’s status as head of the household–to take priority 
over their concern for him as an individual. 
 
 As both the physician and the patient’s children bring their 
concerns to the encounter, they may have established notions of what 
ethical medical behaviour should look like. Indeed, it is likely in both 
cases that they will have been to some extent exposed, through their 
previous experiences in healthcare, to some form of disciplined 
reflection on the moral choices that people traditionally make. In other 
words, they will have had some exposure to principles of medical ethics. 
However, it is likely that the principles that motivate each will be 
different.  
 
 The physician will likely be swayed by two particular 
principles (Veatch, 1997a; Veatch & Flack, 1997). 
 
1. Autonomy  
This principle holds that the patient has a right to make his own 
decisions, and that no treatments can go ahead without the 
patient’s consent. The importance of autonomy as a principle of 
medical ethics can be traced back to the development of 
Protestantism, which gave the lay person more say in 
theological, and therefore ethical, concerns (Veatch, 1997b), 
and from the advent of liberal thought following the 
Enlightenment (Veatch, 1997a). Since these are the forces that 
likely also gave rise to the physician’s communicative 
preferences, it may be useful to think of autonomy as 
representing in medical ethics what individualism, small power 
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distance and low-context orientation represent in 
communication more generally. 
 
2. Veracity 
In order for the patient’s consent to be meaningful, the patient 
has to have enough information to make a reasonable decision. 
Clearly, the patient will have difficulty acquiring this 
information if healthcare practitioners do not disclose it, and so 
honesty between practitioner and patient is paramount. As an 
ethical principle, veracity can be understood as the fallout from 
the Nuremberg trials. Evidence was presented at the trials that 
detailed the horrific experiments carried out by the Nazis, 
ostensibly in the name of science. The trials drove home the 
importance of obtaining voluntary and meaningful consent 
from patients (Beauchamp, 1997; Veatch, 1997b).  
 
For the physician, behaving ethically is largely a question of respecting 
the principles of autonomy and veracity, something that also explains the 
importance placed on obtaining informed consent from patients. 
However, the principles were spawned by historical events in the 
West–the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the 
Nuremberg Trials–which in turn suggests that we cannot expect these 
particular principles to have universal currency. 
 
 Indeed, the understanding that the patient’s children have of 
ethical behaviour is likely shaped by two alternative principles. 
 
1. Filial Piety 
This principle dictates that medical choices should be based on 
an understanding of the roles and responsibilities that exist 
within the family. Parents have an obligation to safeguard 
children, and children owe respect to their parents. In the case 
of an elderly patient, this means that there will be an 
expectation that the patient will be cared for by the rest of the 
family and relieved of many responsibilities, including the 
responsibility of making treatment decisions (Hui, 1999). 
Under filial piety, individual autonomy is replaced by familial 
autonomy. One-on-one encounters between patients and 
healthcare practitioners alone will be rare, and broader 
consultations involving practitioners, patients, and their 
families will be the norm (Fan & Li, 2004; Hui, 1999). As an 
ethical principle, filial piety can be traced back to notions of 
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communitarianism, which stress the individual’s role in the 
wider community (Veatch, 1997a) or perhaps even to the 
Confucian principle of humaneness (often Romanized as jen 
according to the Wade-Giles system or as rén in Pīnyīn) and its 
modelling of interactions in society on relationships in the 
family (Tsai, 2005; Fan & Li, 2004; Hui, 1999). 
 
2. Paternalism  
If filial piety removes the burden of decision-making from the 
patient, then paternalism places it on someone else. It suggests 
that patients are not always able to make decisions that are in 
their own interests, and that someone else may be better placed 
to do so. For example, the paternalist principle holds that 
revealing fateful news to the patient can at times be harmful, 
and it can advocate withholding information from the patient or 
even lying about the patient’s condition (Fan & Li, 2004; Hui, 
1999; Veatch, 1997a). Paternalism, of course, is not only found 
in Eastern ethical traditions; it was widely advocated in 
Western traditions before the advent of informed consent in the 
post-War era, and its presence can still be felt in the West today. 
However, Fan & Li (2004) argue that in Western paternalism 
the physician alone decides whether to withhold information 
from the patient, whereas in Eastern paternalism that decision is 
most often made in consultation with the family. (On this point, 
see also Tai & Tsai, 2003).  
 
What is apparent at this point is that the positions adopted by the 
physician and the patient’s children are consistent with two opposing 
ethical traditions. On the one hand, the physician maintains that 
behaving ethically in this instance requires him to focus on the right that 
the patient has, as an individual, to self-determination, and on his 
obligation to disclose as much information as possible so that the patient 
is truly able to exercise that self-determination. On the other, the 
patient’s children believe strongly that doing right is a matter of showing 
respect to their father by making decisions for him when he is in pain and 
of safeguarding him from frightening news that would only cause him 
further harm. 
 
 The important point here is that the interpreter needs to 
recognize the power that ethical principles have in shaping the encounter 
in the oncologist’s office. In the same way understanding cultural 
tendencies helped her to analyze communication generally, so too will a 
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familiarity with ethical principles help her analyze communication 
specifically within the medical realm. If the interpreter is going to work 
in healthcare, she needs to know the particularities of communication in 
this setting. This knowledge will serve her in good stead, helping her to 
once again predict wider patterns in her clients’ behaviour, to recognize 
them when they are manifested in front of her, and to prepare her own 
responses.  
 
IV. Levels of Trust between Practitioners and Interpreters 
 
As we argued above, the danger in the conversation between the doctor 
and the adult children is that neither side will soften their position. For 
the physician, suggesting that he not obtain informed consent from the 
patient may be akin to “taking away his moral compass” (Solomon, 1997) 
and to casting him adrift without ethical guidance. For the patient’s 
children, the idea of leaving their father unsupported and alone to receive 
devastating news and make what are potentially end-of-life decisions at 
a time when he is already suffering seems cruel and inhumane (Fan & Li, 
2004). With so much at stake and such strong feelings at play, it may 
take a third party to mediate between the two sides. 
 
 For this reason, we argue that it may be appropriate for the 
interpreter to adopt a more interventionist strategy in her work. However, 
before we can explore what such a strategy might look like, it is 
necessary to first understand the variables that place constraints upon her. 
One of the most important variables to consider is the degree of trust that 
has been built up between the interpreter and the physician. This is a 
topic that has been addressed at length elsewhere (Clifford, 2006), so our 
discussion here will be brief. 
 
 There is a widely held belief in the realm of community 
interpreting that the only defensible and ethical strategy for the 
interpreter to use is to repeat in the target language everything that is said 
in the source language as exactly as possible. This belief maintains that 
the role of the interpreter is simply to act as a neutral and invisible 
conduit, transferring information from patient to healthcare provider and 
back again. However, as popular as this “conduit model” of interpreting 
may be in some quarters, observation of interpreters at work has 
demonstrated repeatedly that interpreters engage in a variety of 
behaviours that go beyond simple linguistic transfer (Angelelli, 2004; 
Metzger, 1999; Wadensjö, 1998), and an examination of ethical models 
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in translation studies has suggested that a wider role for the interpreter is 
ethically defensible (Clifford, 2006). 
 
 Nevertheless, advocates of the conduit model stress that it is 
oftentimes difficult to get an interpreter into the doctor’s office in the 
first place. In the scenario outlined at the beginning of this article, it was 
simply taken for granted that an interpreter was present in the 
oncologist’s office, but it frequently takes a lot of lobbying to convince 
healthcare practitioners that it is necessary to work with a professional, 
trained interpreter when treating patients who have limited proficiency 
in the practitioner’s working language. For this reason, advocates of the 
conduit model argue that, once in a practitioner’s presence, interpreters 
should allow the practitioner to have maximum control over the 
encounter with the patient. Doing so increases the likelihood that the 
interpreter will be called into the practitioner’s office the next time 
around, and that patients will therefore have access to the kind of 
communication needed to benefit fully from the healthcare they are 
receiving.  
 
 However, consultations with healthcare providers have 
provided some indication that the dynamics of the relationship between 
interpreter and practitioner may be more complex, and that there may be 
occasions in which the interpreter can exercise more latitude. One way to 
help interpreters choose appropriate strategies is to associate these 
strategies with varying levels of trust that are established as the 
interpreter and the practitioner become accustomed to working together.  
 
1. Cede Control over the Situation 
When a practitioner and interpreter collaborate for the first time, 
the practitioner is unfamiliar with the interpreter’s professional 
competence. As a result, there will likely be only a limited 
sense of trust. In an instance like this, it is probably best for the 
interpreter to work according to the conduit model, that is, to 
make an effort to provide exact translations of all that is said. In 
other words, the interpreter should cede control of the situation 
to the practitioner, in the interests of building a professional 
relationship on trust.  
 
2. Provide Additional Information 
As the provider and interpreter continue to work together, their 
sense of comfort and familiarity may grow. Consequently, the 
provider may call upon the interpreter for isolated bits of 
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cultural information that help provide a better level of care for 
the patient (e.g., the interpreter may warn the provider about 
dietary restrictions that are common in the language 
community, or about religious/cultural holidays that may 
interfere with treatment, etc.). 
 
3. Offer Assistance to a Team Member 
As the provider places evermore trust in the interpreter, the 
interpreter may increasingly be viewed as a member of a 
treatment team. The provider may therefore approach the 
interpreter before an encounter with a patient in order to learn 
about cultural variables that have to be considered when 
mapping out a treatment plan. Alternatively, during the 
encounter with the patient, the interpreter may be asked to help 
mediate knowledge gaps (e.g., the interpreter may explain the 
way the healthcare system functions to the patient, or she may 
explain some of the patient’s health-related expectations to the 
provider). 
  
In short, this quick summary of trust-building suggests two things about 
community interpreting. First, interpreting is a complex activity. It will 
frequently require the interpreter to move beyond the confines of the 
conduit model and take on roles that involve more than simply 
transferring information from the source to the target language. Second, 
the roles that the interpreter is able to adopt will be governed to a large 
extent by the amount of trust that has built up between the interpreter and 
the healthcare provider. At the beginning of a professional relationship, 
the interpreter will likely take on a more limited role, but as that 
relationship grows, the interpreter may be given more latitude to 
intervene in the medical encounter. In this sense, there is an element of 
predictability to the interpreter’s interventions. They will be in part 
directed by trust, just as the interventions made by the physician and the 
patient’s children were directed by communicative preferences and 
ethical principles. 
 
V. Implications for Interpreting 
 
In the preceding section, we examined how interpreters may use cues 
from their collaboration with healthcare providers to judge the type of 
role that they may justifiably assume. However, this examination has not 
yet explained the specific behaviours that might be associated with the 
interpreter’s different roles. In other words, once an interpreter has 
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determined the role that would be appropriate in a given setting, what 
does the interpreter actually do? To answer this question, we now revisit 
each of the three levels of trust and describe what the interpreter in the 
oncologist’s office might do to intervene in each case.  
 
1. Cede Control over the Situation 
If the interpreter is working with the physician for the first time, 
it is not likely that she will have the opportunity to intervene 
actively in the encounter. Instead, it is more likely that her 
behaviour will follow the dictates of the conduit model. 
However, just because she will not be asked to explain the 
cultural and institutional factors at work in this situation to 
anyone does not mean that she can be ignorant of them herself. 
Indeed, she has an obligation to understand the differences in 
communicative preferences and in ethical principles that are at 
play in the oncologist’s office. The conduit model indicates that 
she should remain as neutral as possible, something she cannot 
do if she does not understand the variables that have led both 
the physician and the patient’s children to take up their 
respective positions.  
 
For example, if the interpreter’s own communication 
preferences are in line with those of the physician, she may 
have difficulty empathizing with the children and be tempted to 
view them as unreasonable people who are asking the doctor to 
behave unethically. Conversely, if her communication 
preferences are in line with those of the children, she may be 
tempted to conclude that the doctor is a heartless man who 
wants the children to be disloyal and disrespectful. In either 
case, she will have difficulty being a neutral and invisible 
conduit for information transfer, because the temptation will be 
great to pass judgement on one of the two parties. To counter 
this difficulty, she will need to actively call upon her 
knowledge of communication and ethics, suggesting that even 
within the confines of the conduit model, there is an element of 
activism to the work that she carries out. 
 
2. Provide Additional Information 
If the interpreter is beginning to form a working relationship 
with the physician, she may occasionally have the opportunity 
to make her own, non-interpreted contributions to the 
conversation. She may want to consider using this opportunity 
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to add information that will help each side reach out to the other. 
To do so, she will have to take two quick actions. First, she will 
need to identify for herself the cultural and institutional 
variables that are shaping the misunderstanding. Second, she 
will need to find a concise way of describing those variables to 
the two parties in the encounter.  
 
The interpreter may, for instance, point out to the physician that 
“in the East, it is very important for children to help their 
parents save face.” In a similar aside to the patient’s children, 
the interpreter might note that “in the West, it is very important 
for the practitioner to obtain informed consent.” Clearly, 
neither of these brief statements is going to resolve the 
disagreement entirely, but they will afford each party a glimpse 
into the world of the other. In addition, the interpreter will have 
to be careful to add this information in a way that is transparent 
(Solomon, 1997). She will have to distinguish the instances 
when she is contributing something of her own accord from 
those where she is interpreting something the physician or the 
children said. Usually, it is enough to consistently mark 
non-interpreted utterances (“I’d like to add something of my 
own here…”) and leave interpreted utterances consistently 
unmarked. 
 
3. Offer Assistance to a Team Member 
If there is a well established working relationship between the 
interpreter and the physician, the interpreter may have the 
opportunity to offer more substantial assistance. This 
opportunity may come in the form of a briefing session that 
takes place before an encounter with actual patients. In these 
sessions, the interpreter’s duty is to raise issues that could 
potentially have a negative impact on cross-cultural healthcare 
communication, and also to explore the ways in which 
compromise can be used to prevent miscommunication.  
 
For example, the interpreter should point out that family 
involvement will be a strong theme in the elderly patient’s 
treatment, and she should signal that the children may be very 
protective of their father. If necessary, she can very briefly 
describe why that is the case, by outlining some of the material 
presented in this article about communication preferences and 
ethical principles. However, the interpreter’s most valuable 
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contribution may potentially lie in her ability to help the 
physician construct strategies that can potentially avoid a 
disagreement with the children before it happens. One strategy, 
described in detail in Solomon (1997), may be to sit down with 
the elderly patient during his first visit and explain that the 
doctor would be willing to share information about the patient’s 
condition in one of three ways: with the patient alone, with the 
patient’s children alone, or with the patient in the presence of 
his family. The patient could then decide which of the three 
options would be his preference. This strategy helps the 
physician address the issue of autonomy by understanding 
whether autonomy in this situation will take the form of 
individual autonomy, family autonomy with paternalistic 
decision-making (i.e., the children make a decision without 
necessarily informing the patient), or family autonomy with 
family co-decision-making (i.e., all family members have a say 
in the decision) (Cong, 2004).  
 
An alternative strategy would involve the physician sitting 
down to talk about communication with both the patient and his 
children. He could start by saying that he recognizes that 
families often build an important bridge between the doctors 
and the patients, but that he likes to encourage families to 
actually cross the bridge, that is, to share information with the 
patient (Cong, 2004). This approach has several advantages. 
First, it signals to the family that their role and their wishes will 
be valued and respected. Second, it allows the physician to 
broach the topic of his obligation to obtain informed consent. 
However, the physician should be aware that the children’s 
method of “crossing the bridge” may not take the form he 
expects. Cong’s (2004) interviews with healthcare stakeholders 
in one Eastern locality, Beijing, showed how information can 
be transmitted both indirectly and clearly. The stakeholders 
suggested that families tend to disclose information to patients 
when the outcome is positive. When it is negative, information 
tends not to be disclosed. Thus, it is likely possible for patients 
to recognize fateful news by the fact that their families are not 
forthcoming with it.  
 
There is also a final possibility that might salvage the situation in the 
oncologist’s office the way it actually played out. Culhane-Pera (2003) 
describes a case where she treated an elderly female patient who was 
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facing a terminal diagnosis. The patient was from a culture that might 
accurately be described as collectivist–decisions about her treatment 
were being made by her adult children in consultation with community 
leaders. Culhane-Pera attended a decision-making meeting where the 
patient was absent, and subsequently went to see the woman. She 
informed her patient that she had been talking with the patient’s children 
about treatment, and she asked whether the patient wanted to know what 
they had talked about. Culhane-Pera then notes that she watched and 
listened carefully for the patient’s high-context response (i.e., silence, 
changing the topic–both of which signalled the answer “no”). The 
interpreter might counsel the oncologist to use a similar approach in his 
dealings with the elderly man from Hong Kong. 
 
In each of the three cases outlined above, what is noteworthy is the 
interpreter’s intervention. At the first level of trust, there is no overtly 
active intervention. In other words, the only activity the interpreter is 
outwardly engaged in is the matching of source-language forms with 
corresponding target-language ones. However, the interpreter does need 
to educate herself about issues that go beyond linguistic transfer if she is 
to carry out her work successfully. At the second level, the interpreter is 
able to intervene, that is, she breaks out of the constraints of the conduit 
model to make an independent contribution to the discussion in the 
oncologist’s office. That intervention is limited in nature–she is only 
able to make a few quick observations, taking care to identify them as 
such–but the information she provides may allow the other actors in the 
conversation to bridge the distance that separates them. Finally, at the 
third level of trust, the interpreter intervenes in the proceedings in an 
overt and active way. She is a participant in the briefing sessions where 
treatment plans are explored, and she uses her expertise in 
cross-linguistic and cross-cultural communication to propose 
communication strategies to the physician.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have outlined a number of important variables that 
affect the interpreter’s work in the doctor’s office. Interpreters must be 
aware of differences in culture-based communication preferences that 
affect community interpreting generally, and they must be conscious of 
the principles of medical ethics that will influence interpreting 
specifically in the area of healthcare. They must also understand the 
ways in which the relationships they have built with healthcare providers 
can remove constraints placed around their role.  
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 The interpreter’s knowledge of these three variables is key. In 
healthcare interpreting, there will be instances where communication 
between patients and providers is stalled by misunderstandings. To 
circumvent these misunderstandings, each side needs to open a window 
through which they can fairly and accurately view the other, yet it seems 
unlikely that in all cases they will be able to open this window for 
themselves. Healthcare practitioners have a heavy burden ensuring that 
their technical knowledge and ability to practice are kept at a level that is 
state-of-the-art. To be sure, they can take some responsibility for 
delivering healthcare in a way that is culturally sensitive, but it seems 
unreasonable to believe that they will be able to gather detailed 
knowledge about the cultural tendencies and ethical beliefs of all the 
cultural communities that they serve. It likewise seems unfair to expect 
patients who require interpreting to take responsibility for successful 
cross-cultural communication, particularly when patients have had 
limited access to formal education or when they are relative newcomers 
to the countries in which they find themselves. Instead, it makes better 
sense to place interpreters in charge of success in cross-cultural 
healthcare communication. Through their language knowledge, 
interpreters have a good foundation for this task, and it is reasonable to 
ask them to develop a comprehensive understanding of the peoples who 
are represented by their working languages. Of course, interpreters need 
to build on their foundation and cultivate their knowledge of 
communication preferences, ethical principles, and levels of trust. Only 
then can they effectively and responsibly take an interventionist 
approach to their work.  
 
 However, interpreters cannot put their knowledge of the three 
variables to good use if they do not possess that knowledge in the first 
place. And while there are obviously individual interpreters who will be 
able to reflect on their professional experiences and become overtly 
aware of the three variables, there are others who will not. For this 
reason, the kind of information presented here should be included in the 
training that community interpreters receive. Currently, community 
interpreting as a profession is in a state of flux–where once formal 
training for community interpreters was rare, an ever-increasing amount 
of attention is now being paid to the profession, and this attention will 
undoubtedly result in more formal training. The weight of the evidence 
presented in this article would seem to indicate that future training 
programs should focus squarely on the complexity of the role of the 
interpreter and on the information that interpreters need to navigate that 
complexity.  
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 Ultimately, this training will help interpreters to be more 
successful in their work. This success will hopefully translate into the 
prevention of the types of disagreement that was mapped out in this 
article. Instead of retreating to their entrenched positions, what 
if–through the interpreter’s interventions–the physician and the patient’s 
children were each able to come to a better understanding of the other’s 
position?  
 
 The physician might reflect on the situation and note, “Before, I 
always obtained informed consent by dealing directly with my patient as 
an individual, but now I can see that sometimes it’s important to work 
with the patient as a member of a larger group.” Similarly, the patient’s 
children might consider the events at hand and remark, “We want to 
protect our father while he’s vulnerable, but we can see that it makes 
sense for the doctor to offer the information needed to offer our father 
the best care possible.” If these are the statements made in the 
oncologist’s office, then the interpreter will know that she has 
successfully taken on an active role in treatment decision-making and 
guided her clients to meaningful understanding. In so doing, she will 
have paved the way for a truly ethical decision about curative or 
palliative treatment, and she will have done her part to help ensure that 
the physician is able to offer quality care, that the patient’s children see 
their loved one treated with compassion and respect, and that the patient 
can hope for a more positive outcome. 
 
University of Toronto 
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ABSTRACT: Healthcare Interpreting and Informed Consent: 
What is the Interpreter’s Role in Treatment Decision-Making? ─ 
This article examines the part that healthcare interpreters play in 
cross-cultural medical ethics, and it argues that there are instances when 
the interpreter needs to assume an interventionist role. However, the 
interpreter cannot take on this role without developing expertise in the 
tendencies that distinguish general communication from culture to 
culture, in the ethical principles that govern medical communication in 
different communities, and in the development of professional 
relationships in healthcare. The article describes each of these three 
variables with reference to a case scenario, and it outlines a number of 
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interventionist strategies that could be potentially open to the interpreter. 
It concludes with a note about the importance of the three variables for 
community interpreter training. 
 
RÉSUMÉ : L’interprétation dans le domaine des soins de santé et le 
consentement éclairé: quel est le rôle de l’interprète dans le choix du 
traitement? ─ Dans cet article, l’auteur fait le point sur le rôle de 
l’interprète communautaire face à des conflits d’éthique dans le domaine 
de la santé. Dans des circonstances bien définies, on propose à 
l’interprète un comportement plus interventionniste que de coutume. 
Mais avant d’intervenir plus activement, l’interprète doit développer ses 
compétences dans trois domaines : il doit se familiariser avec les facteurs 
servant à décrire la communication dans différentes cultures; il doit 
connaître les principes d’éthique médicale privilégiés par différentes 
collectivités; et il doit bien comprendre le fonctionnement de ses 
relations avec des professionnels de la santé. Après avoir décrit, à l’aide 
d’une étude de cas, chacune de ces trois compétences, l’auteur examine 
les stratégies interventionnistes disponibles à l’interprète et, en guise de 
conclusion, il souligne l’importance des idées présentées dans l’article 
pour la formation d’interprètes communautaires. 
 
Keywords: community interpreting, informed consent, role of the 
interpreter, healthcare. 
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